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Abstract 
In this article, I discuss the current state of the debate around the simulation hypothesis, the 
idea that the world we inhabit is a computer simulation existing in some other universe. 
Considering recent work from a range of authors, I suggest that statistical arguments in 
favour of a simulated world are naïve and fail to account either for Occam’s razor or for 
alternative existential possibilities besides base reality and a simulation. Most significantly, I 
observe that it would be computationally impossible in our own universe to simulate a 
similar cosmos at fine granularity. This implies substantial differences in size and 
information content between simulating and simulated universes. I argue that this makes 
serious analysis of the simulation argument extremely difficult. I suggest that Christian 
theology has no reason to reinvent itself to accommodate simulism; the two should be 
viewed as mutually exclusive worldviews. Further, I note that the existence of a human soul 
or spirit, or indeed any non-reductionist explanation of human consciousness, would 
undermine the assumption of substrate independence that simulism requires.  
 
Keywords 
Simulation hypothesis, limits of computation, information, Occam’s razor, substrate 
independence, soul, spirit, consciousness. 
 
1 Introduction 
Bostrom1 formalised and popularised the simulation hypothesis. In his paper, he claimed 
that one of the following statements is true 
A) Our species, or by extension a species like ours, is unlikely to survive long enough 
to reach a posthuman stage of highly advanced technology;  
B) Species that do reach such a stage are unlikely to run a large number of 
simulations of societal evolution containing conscious simulated characters; 
C) We are likely to be living in such a simulation. 
His argument is known as the simulation argument and the scenario that our universe is in 
fact a simulation is called the simulation hypothesis. I illustrate an outline of Bostrom’s line 
of reasoning in Figure 1. 
Bostrom’s paper has generated a substantial quantity of comment and discussion, with 674 
total Google Scholar citations as of February 2019. Amongst these are some articles by 
respected thinkers in reputable publications, although only 153 are in academic journals 
indexed by Web of Knowledge. There are also sources and authors of the less rigorous or 
less mainstream varieties; within these, there are nonetheless some interesting ideas. 
Herein, I consider the various kinds of discussion that have been raised around the 
simulation argument and the simulation hypothesis. These ideas have also been aired in a 
seminar presentation which parallels this manuscript,2 given at a meeting of the St Andrews 
Institute for Data-Intensive Research in August 2018 and in an undergraduate lecture on 
Science and Religion which is publicly available.3  
 
2 State of the Field 
2.1 Logical, Philosophical, and Probabilistic Discussions 
Probabilistic arguments are widely used both in serious academic discussion and in less 
formal fora. Such approaches have been used to argue both for and against the existence of 
God, for a multiverse, to claim that life is widespread or rare in the universe, and so on. 
These arguments are very dependent upon the range of possible options that are 
considered, the values ascribed to a priori probabilities, and the models and assumptions 
(for example those regarding independence and contingency) used to compute likelihoods 
of various scenarios. A number of discussions of these kinds, including some Bayesian 
presentations, have been applied to the simulation argument. 
Some papers draw on an analogy with the doomsday argument, including Lewis4 and 
Aranyosi.5 Much of this material relates to setting reasonable values of prior probabilities of 
different scenarios. Francheschi6 raises some points related to the calculation of 
probabilities dependent on sets of states which occur at different times. Weatherson7 
criticised what he saw as Bostrom’s implicit probabilistic assumptions underlying the degree 
of belief in certain propositions and the estimation of conditional probabilities; Bostrom8 
replied defending his original paper. In essence these are arguments about which states one 
should sum over, and what prior probabilities one should assign to them.   
Ćirković9 suggests that the existential risk to a civilisation of developing potentially powerful 
and hostile AI directly affects the simulation argument. Specifically, AI risk makes 
Bostrom’s10 condition (A), extinction before reaching a posthuman stage, more likely. One 
might surmise that mindfulness of this risk might also reduce the prospects of development 
of the kind of computer technology leading to ancestor simulations, hence also affecting 
condition (B). Ćirković11 is fairly dismissive of the possibility of numerous simulations being 
run by artificial intelligences themselves after the extinction of the precursor biological 
species, though other thinkers may consider that scenario realistic. 
Some critics also raise the issue of summing over states corresponding to either known 
present or hypothetical future observers. Eckhardt12 even argues that the simulation 
argument implies time-reversed causation. Bostrom himself acknowledged a numerical 
difficulty with the assumptions of the original argument in the case of a posthuman 
civilisation having an ‘unusually brief pre-posthuman phase’ and presented a slightly 
amended ‘patched’ version of his original argument.13 Wehr14 contends that even the 
patched simulation argument contains both vagueness and logical errors. Besnard15 attacks 
the simulation argument on a number of grounds, though it does not appear that he has 
found a valid logical refutation. Sturman16 uses Occam’s Razor to argue against simulism, 
saying that the idea of our living in a simulated reality is unnecessarily complex. He also 
raises the objection that Bostrom’s argument applies a conclusion from our familiar world to 
an entirely hypothetical universe about whose physical laws we know nothing.  
One limitation of Bostrom’s paper17 is its expression of Simulation v Base Reality as a 
dichotomous choice between only two possibilities. The simulation hypothesis is a relatively 
new arrival on the intellectual landscape. For centuries, thinkers have wrestled with the idea 
of a single reality, whether created by God or otherwise, whether caused or uncaused, 
whether deterministic or stochastic. More recently, probabilistic arguments have been 
confidently made in favour of a multiverse18 which could function as an explanation for fine-
tuning; a somewhat related idea also appears in the many worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.19 The simulation hypothesis is a comparatively novel possibility, beyond 
imagination only a few decades ago. Like the multiverse, an apparently powerful 
probability-based argument can be made for it, an argument embraced by entrepreneur 
Elon Musk.20 This line of reasoning is closely related to Bostrom’s work, predicated on the 
idea that posthuman civilisations probably run very many such simulations containing vastly 
more observers than base reality. However, this thinking fails to account for all currently 
popular existential possibilities, let alone for whatever as-yet-unconsidered models of 
reality might be discussed alongside the unique physical universe, the multiverse, many 
worlds, and the simulation hypothesis in philosophers’ future deliberations.  For instance, 
advanced alien societies could create potentially very many real, not simulated, universes.21 
 
2.2 Scientific ideas that impact upon the simulation argument 
The original simulation argument22 contains two assumptions which are not formally part of 
its logical trifurcation. Both of these assumptions are potentially points where critics might 
seek weaknesses in the simulation argument. The first is the substrate independence of 
consciousness, that the full experience of human consciousness could be faithfully 
reproduced by simulation within a computing device. That will be false if it is just not 
possible to reproduce humanlike consciousness in a computer, and Bostrom’s assumption of 
substrate independence would not hold.  Sturman,23 for example, argues against the 
plausibility of in silico consciousness. I suggest that consciousness will probably be 
impossible to recreate if there is something fundamental about the biological substance of 
our brains that cannot be replicated in silico, and consciousness then turns out to be an 
emergent property dependent on the biological substrate as well as the complexity of the 
computation. There is also an inherent requirement that the mind be nothing but 
computation in the brain; in terms of an ancient but familiar model, dualists may counter-
argue that the machine simply cannot be conscious without its ghost. I discuss this idea of a 
human soul or spirit below in Section 3.3, and do so in a specifically Christian context. 
The second main assumption of the simulation argument is that the future development of 
computer power will be sufficient to support such a simulation. Bostrom’s original paper24 
contains a justification of this assumption, which however seems far from certain. 
Computation has both theoretical25 and practical limits. Very possibly, such a simulation is 
not technically possible in our world because the amount of computation required in 
modelling the universe, or at least a character’s observable and comprehensible universe, is 
infeasibly large. A number of authors have indeed attempted to oppose the simulation 
argument on grounds of the necessary kind or complexity or quantity of computation being 
inaccessible. Eckhardt26 mentions the possibility that such a simulation is infeasible, though 
without full discussion. Beisbart27 claims that the way in which computers operate is 
fundamentally different from, and incapable of replicating, the manner in which brains 
operate. Syropoulos28 suggests that the universe is fundamentally incomputable. Lewis29 
argues that nested simulations within simulations, as sometimes advocated probabilistically 
by proponents of simulism, are impossible.  
In order to present the simulation argument in a way that permits meaningful analysis, I 
claim here that it is necessary to assume that the simulating and simulated universes have 
similar physics. I read the core argument in Bostrom’s original paper30 as assessing in 
essence whether a species such as us in a universe like this one could feasibly develop to the 
point of creating ancestor simulations with conscious characters, who would then 
experience a reality similar to ours. While one could in principle attribute all manner of 
magical properties to the simulators’ base reality, the existence of such a world would be 
untestable and would push simulism squarely into the realm of pseudo-religious rather than 
scientific beliefs. It would be almost impossible to have a sensible discussion of any of the 
relevant factors such as the physical limits of computation, the nature of consciousness, the 
life expectancy of an intelligent species, or the likelihood of their running ancestor 
simulations if the simulators’ laws of nature were arbitrarily different from ours. Thus, we 
have little choice but to use feasibility in our universe as a proxy for feasibility in theirs, and 
limit our discussions to scenarios where the laws of physics in the simulation at least 
approximate those in the base reality. 
However, this apparently necessary assumption that the two worlds are alike seems to be 
somewhat undermined by strong arguments suggesting that the two universes must be 
quite different in their extents. The simulating universe contains the simulated universe, 
plus very much else. Therefore, it is necessarily many orders of magnitude bigger in terms of 
its size and therefore of its information content. The relationship between the universe’s 
size and its entropy is discussed in detail in reference, 31 but herein I make the assumptions 
that entropy density is at least an approximately meaningful concept and that the total 
information needed to describe a possible universe tends to increase roughly linearly with 
its volume. Our observable universe is estimated to be around 3.651080 m3 in volume,32 
whereas even a large computer on which we might run a simulation will probably be 
significantly less than 1 m3, only a fraction of which is devoted to the computer’s memory. 
Lloyd,33 for instance, suggests a volume of 10-3 m3 for his hypothetical ultimate laptop. 
These scales differ by a little more than 83 orders of magnitude. This margin would be 
considerably greater without the assumption that most of the volume of the computer is 
information carrying.  
Even for hypothetical planet-sized computers, there would still be a massive disparity with 
the size of an entire universe. In principle, one could imagine an alien computer whose 
information content approaches the Bekenstein bound34,35 for its size, though such a device 
seems improbably exotic. This computer would be informationally equivalent to a black hole 
of the same size. Such a device would contain sufficient information to simulate a region of 
space substantially larger than itself, but still manifestly contains less information than an 
entire universe with the same physical laws. Although the disparity for such a device might 
be substantially less than 83 orders of magnitude, that disparity nonetheless remains very 
large indeed. 
Thus we can safely conclude that a simulated version of our universe would not come 
anywhere close to fitting inside any feasibly imaginable computer. There are just far too few 
particles in the plausible volume of a computer to carry the requisite quantity of 
information. This suggests either that the simulated universe is necessarily vastly smaller 
than the simulating one, or else that it is represented at a very much coarser granularity. 
The latter possibility might correspond to a more pixelated or lower definition universe with 
a correspondingly smaller information density. 
Ringel and Kovrizhin36 recently published a paper on the complexity of simulating quantum 
effects, a somewhat superficial reading of which led at least one commentator to claim that 
“Physicists find we’re not living in a computer simulation”.37 Others subsequently 
challenged that interpretation, suggesting instead that the results only ruled out simulating 
complex quantum systems on a classical computer and that simulation using quantum 
computing could not be excluded.38 Estimating the cost of a simulation is complicated by the 
lack of knowledge of how extensive it needs to be. Does this involve simulating the whole 
universe at fine granularity, or only simulating at least billions of complex conscious minds? I 
exclude from serious consideration the logically coherent but unproductive solipsistic 
possibility that the simulators generate only a single conscious brain, with the rest of 
universe and all other persons filled in in a convincing-enough way. 
 
2.3 Potential tests of the simulation hypothesis 
I now consider potential ways in which one might test the simulation hypothesis. By this I 
mean experiments feasible either now or in the future, and thought experiments, whose 
results and interpretation might significantly affect our best estimate of the likelihood of the 
simulation hypothesis. An initial observation is that we do not know whether the laws of 
physics in a hypothetical simulated universe correspond exactly, closely, or hardly at all with 
that of the simulators’ real universe; though the earlier assumptions would exclude serious 
examination of the simulation hypothesis in the latter case. An exact correspondence would 
imply that the simulators knew their laws of physics very precisely, which Barrow39 thinks 
unlikely. It would also mean that, given the purpose of the simulation and cost 
considerations, approximation was not warranted.  
While of course we do not know for sure why a hypothetical simulator might run a putative 
simulation, we can think about why we ourselves run simulations. Our principal purposes 
are entertainment and scientific research; both categories can be interpreted broadly. If we 
were to simulate the development of a society or of a universe, we might do it for 
entertainment, for education, as scientific research into how civilisations or universes 
operate and evolve, or maybe as part of an exercise to predict possible futures or better to 
understand history. One might imagine investigating what physical parameters might lead 
to a universe in which life could evolve, or perhaps how a society deals with an 
environmental or existential crisis. This could be analogous to running simulations, and 
typically very many of them, in contexts we are more familiar with: to forecast the weather, 
to predict optimal investment strategies on the stock market, to determine the tactics most 
likely to be successful in a Formula 1 race, or for the military to understand the likely 
consequences of possible strategies in a war. Possibly the key facet of such a simulation 
might be studying the mind, brain or consciousness. It is not clear whether simulators would 
care about detection of simulated status by characters within the virtual world, and whether 
they would be careful to avoid leaving clues in the design of that universe. 
Depending on the nature and purpose of the simulation, our own scientific and computing 
communities use different models of physics in different contexts. Mostly, we use broadly 
Newtonian physics, though there are circumstances such as modelling a chemical reaction40 
where we need to include quantum mechanics; relativistic simulations also exist. Generally, 
the physics is required only to be good enough for the purpose at hand, and Barrow41 
suggests that this might be the case in a simulated universe. For example, video games will 
render water in a way that looks visually credible, but does not reflect the true complexity 
of fluid mechanics. 
In the event that we are in a simulation with only approximately real physics, it is possible 
that the starting point of the simulation is not the temporal origin of the universe and hence 
that the physics of our universe need not be adequate to describe its earliest stages. This 
might suggest that, if at some future time we appear to have exhausted new physics, our 
best theories would still fail to describe cosmology accurately. A simulated world that did 
not start from t=0 might endlessly puzzle its cosmologists. 
I also note that, if the simulating of minds is a substantial part of the cost of the whole 
simulation, then finding large numbers of sentient alien species in our galaxy would raise 
our best estimate of the expense of the computation required. Finding even one 
independent origin of sentient life cosmically close to ourselves would shift the assumed 
parameters of the Drake equation42 towards suggesting that the universe contains very 
many minds indeed. This would be less relevant if the cost is largely that of simulating the 
physical universe. 
Beane et al.43 discuss the physics implied by a simulated world. Their work assumes that the 
simulation is based on an underlying three-dimensional grid of cubic symmetry. In principle, 
such a world would contain preferred directions, and hence not be rotationally invariant. 
Beane et al.44 argue that this would imply breaking of both parity and Lorentz invariance. 
They also suggest that a lattice spacing larger than around 10-27m would result in rotational 
asymmetry in the distributions of high energy cosmic rays. Their model requires 
quantisation of both space and time on some scale, neither of which has currently been 
observed. The Planck length is around 10-35m, about eight orders of magnitude smaller than 
the threshold lattice spacing they discuss. The Planck time is around 10-43s. Besnard45 briefly 
mentions these issues of symmetry breaking and granularity or quantisation of space and 
time. Analogies with our own simulations might suggest that a simulated universe would 
probably either be finite or have periodic boundary conditions, rather than being infinite. 
However, it is also quite possible that a simulation would not use a cubic grid, or any other 
regular array of points. One might also speculate on whether the effects of the chosen 
coordinate system or of the finite precision of the computer’s arithmetic might be 
detectable to the simulated beings as asymmetry, finite granularity, or indeed errors. 
Barrow46 suggests that, in so extensive a simulation, numerical inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies would build up over time and that the simulators would be required to 
intervene to correct such errors. He proposes, speculatively, that errors might appear as 
inconsistencies and changes in the constants of nature. He posits that such occasional 
interventions might appear to us as glitches, observations that appear to contradict normal 
laws of physics. He does not use words like miraculous, supernatural, or paranormal to 
describe such events, but some might. 
Campbell et al.47 suggest that if we assume that the major cost of the simulation is 
simulating brains rather than modelling the physical universe, then a major saving could be 
made by rendering reality only when information becomes available for observation by a 
character. This, naturally, affects our interpretation of quantum mechanics, implying that 
the cat need not be either living or dead until someone looks into the box. They suggest a 
number of quantum mechanical experiments, using double slits rather than poisoned 
felines, to help elucidate whether our world resembles that which they would expect under 
simulism. They also mention that a simulation could easily permit non-local causation and 
faster than light transmission of information, since the computer would hold the states of 
objects arbitrarily distant, which could interact in silico, or more likely in some other 
computing medium, rather than through real space.  
 
2.4 Determinism and the simulation hypothesis 
We can run either simulations such as Molecular Dynamics, which emulate deterministic 
Newtonian physics, or those like Monte-Carlo that emulate a stochastic process. 
Notwithstanding its association with randomness, the progress of a Monte-Carlo simulation 
is in practice deterministic once its random seed has been chosen, as it is based on pseudo-
random numbers.48 This allows a failed or corrupted calculation to be replaced by one which 
will obtain the same result as if the original had proceeded as intended. However, this 
feature probably would not be obvious from the inside.  As an alternative to an algorithm 
modelling deterministic or indeterministic physics, we can also run interactive programs. 
Many games are examples of this kind, with the course of events depending on inputs from 
users. If a simulation were of this type, some turns of events would depend on simulators’ 
decisions.  
Within the context of a broadly Monte-Carlo style simulation emulating random behaviour, 
one might speculatively suggest that any conscious characters would perceive their universe 
to operate stochastically. This seems essentially consistent with our current understanding 
of our own universe, though the opposite would have been the case through much of the 
history of scientific thought. Though the stochastic Copenhagen interpretation is the 
working assumption of many scientists, there are multiple different available interpretations 
of quantum mechanics. It is still not definitively established whether our own world is best 
described as deterministic or random at a fundamental level. 
 
 
 
 
3. Relationship to Christian doctrine, theology and apologetics 
3.1 God and the simulators 
The notion that simulators are our God or gods, discussed for example by Steinhart,49 seems 
superficial. God in the Christian understanding, possessing the full attributes of deity, is 
loving, omnipotent, omnipresent and eternal. Simulators, in contrast, are presumed by 
adherents of simulism to be posthuman, or indeed postalien, mortal and fallible creatures, 
though with high levels of intelligence and technological development. Their moral or 
ethical characteristics are unknown; beyond firstly their having been sufficiently benign to 
one another to survive technological development without blowing themselves up, and 
secondly having no scruples about playing masters to a simulated universe. While simulators 
could in principle have virtually unlimited power over our universe, such a version of 
omnipotence is far from being the same thing as true divinity in the Christian understanding. 
As discussed above in Section 2.4, a simulation could either start from defined initial 
conditions and be left to run by itself somewhat like the world conceived of in a deist view, 
or else be set up such that the simulators could actively intervene. Such intervention would, 
however, be more akin to the interaction between a player and a computer game than to 
the relationship that theologians consider God to have with the world. 
My view is that there is no benefit in Christian theologians or apologists making any attempt 
to accommodate such an alien notion of divinity. The Christian and simulist worldviews have 
quite different notions of the nature of the Creator or creators, and indeed of the nature of 
reality itself. It is most realistic to see them as mutually exclusive accounts of the world. 
 
3.2 A digital afterlife? 
Authors including Steinhart,50 Graziano51 and indeed Bostrom52 have discussed the idea of a 
so-called digital afterlife. In this context, the phrase means preserving or reconstructing an 
individual’s conscious mind after death within a computing device. This is the meaning I 
address here, although confusingly the same phrase is sometimes used to describe a 
deceased person’s continuing footprint on the internet and social media platforms. While 
Christian views of the afterlife are not uniform, containing varying emphases on an immortal 
soul or bodily resurrection, this digital afterlife is something quite different from any of 
them. This notion depicts a technological attempt to prolong either a form or facsimile of 
life, more conceptually akin to cryopreservation than to the Christian belief in salvation. 
From the Christian viewpoint, perhaps this is an afterlife – but not as we know it. 
 
 
 
3.3 Substrate independence and Christian belief 
There is a tension between traditional Christian belief and the simulation argument’s 
assumption of substrate independence, that human consciousness could be generated 
directly by computations of sufficient complexity within a computer. In a fully reductionist 
worldview, substrate independence would seem a highly rational assumption. I indeed claim 
that the simulation argument relies on a substantial dose of nothing-buttery in one’s view of 
human consciousness. This term nothing-buttery, meaning over-zealous application of 
reductionism, is familiar to many students of the science-religion dialogue from its 1993 use 
by Holder.53 Its origins go back somewhat further, having been referenced in 1955 by 
Pfeiffer54 and attributed by him to an unnamed earlier source; more modern authors 
sometimes refer to the same idea as greedy reductionism. This is the kind of thinking that 
says that because thoughts can be described as signals in a network, therefore the mind 
must be entirely described by these impulses transmitted between neurons. 
The existence of a human soul or spirit, something that could not be described fully as a set 
of electrical impulses in a network of neurons, would undermine this key assumption of 
simulism. This is the case, at least, if we assume that the soul does not automatically come 
into existence as a consequence of computational complexity. Belief in such a soul is not 
limited merely to dualist philosophies of the kind advocated by Descartes, but includes any 
theological or metaphysical viewpoint that goes beyond a purely material description of 
human consciousness. Acceptance of the existence of such a soul or spirit is widespread 
amongst Christians, other than a small physicalist minority, and also in many other major 
religious traditions.  Amongst academic thinkers, such belief is however much less 
prevalent; in 1998 Larson & Witham reported only 7.9% of leading scientists as believing in 
an immortal soul.55 The assumption of substrate independence is likely to seem more 
plausible to people without a prior conflicting belief, and is unsurprisingly not widely seen in 
academic circles as a major obstacle to the development of self-aware artificial intelligence.  
 
3.4 Intelligent design for humanists? 
Even if it is meaningful or potentially factual to say that we live in a simulation, would this 
be knowable or scientifically testable? Metere argues that it is not, that simulism is more 
akin to a religious belief.56 Philosopher and theologian Keith Ward wrote: ‘The question of 
God is certainly a factual one, but certainly not a scientific one’.57 The same would apply to 
the existence of simulators if this did not have observable consequences, implying that the 
question could not be addressed by the scientific method. A related point refers not so 
much to the validity of the simulation argument as to the perceived need for it. Is some 
specific explanation required to account for the putative unlikeliness of the universe, for 
instance in terms of the apparent fine tuning of physical constants to precisely the values 
that permit the evolution of life?58 The putative need to rationalise something so allegedly 
improbable is often used as an intellectual justification for Christianity or other theistic 
belief systems. In an analogous way, simulism could be seen as intelligent design for 
humanists. That is, simulism provides a rationale for our world’s existence, but does so 
without making any specific moral or behavioural demands of its believers. As discussed 
above, the characteristics usually ascribed to the hypothetical simulators are those of a 
highly intelligent and technologically advanced civilization, not those of a deity. Fine tuning 
could potentially be rationalised in other ways too, for instance through either a 
multiverse59 or the anthropic principle. Simulism could equally well be seen as a 21st century 
variant of the dream hypothesis, taking the ancient idea that reality is some kind of illusion 
and couching it in the technological language of science fiction. The dream hypothesis itself 
does not appear to be scientifically testable, and is probably too nebulous for formal 
refutation. Nonetheless, few people would consider it to be a serious or productive theory 
of the world. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Firstly, I claim that considerations of universe size, and in particular information content, 
make the simulation argument difficult to sustain. I note that Bostrom’s argument60 is an 
essentially statistical one. It assumes that we can sum over real observers whom we know 
to exist now and hypothetical simulated observers who might exist at some time in the 
future, while counting each alike. Clearly it is meaningful to ask whether our own 
descendants could one day run a simulation containing conscious characters. However, I 
argue here that our observable universe is 80 or more orders of magnitude bigger than a 
computer, yet information in the simulation must be carried by real particles in the real world. Thus, 
a universe like ours could not be simulated at fine granularity in a computer within our 
world. This suggests that simulated universes must be much smaller or simpler than real ones. 
Hence, any conscious characters that we or our descendants simulate in the future would perceive 
themselves to inhabit a universe containing much less information than does our own. 
Similarly, any creatures simulating us must inhabit a universe containing significantly more 
information than ours. I argue that one cannot meaningfully evaluate how the propositions 
comprising the simulation argument would apply to such a larger universe. I contend that 
the inevitable information disparity between simulating and simulated universes violates 
the assumption of similar worlds that is required meaningfully to assess the plausibility of 
ours being a simulated world. This implies that we cannot reasonably infer very much about 
a hypothetical simulating universe from comparison with our own. I claim that, under these 
circumstances, the simulation argument is not applicable to the world in which we live. We 
can infer nothing remotely quantitative about the likelihood of our being Sims.  
Secondly, the simulation argument takes no account of the complexity of the simulation 
hypothesis. I argue that the simulation argument is unnecessarily complicated, which 
implies that it is disfavoured by Occam’s razor. While not a new insight,61 this aspect has 
been underemphasised in the existing literature discussing simulism. We have no reason to 
prefer simulism over other simpler explanations for our existence. 
Thirdly, and without attempting to enumerate all possibilities, I suggest that it is unsafe to 
treat the question as if base reality and simulation are the only two kinds of universe that 
could exist. A multiverse model62 might not strictly affect the logic of the simulation 
argument, but it would reduce the need for a complex explanation of the apparent 
unlikeliness of our world and the ostensible fine-tuning of the physical constants.  As 
another example, technologically advanced aliens might be capable of creating physically 
real universes.63 A Christian worldview, and indeed other theistic belief systems, will also 
meet this requirement to provide a reason for our world’s existence. 
Finally, I note that since the nature of a simulators’ universe is unknown, and probably 
unknowable, it is impossible fully to refute the simulation hypothesis. However, meaningful 
analysis of the simulation hypothesis seems impossible if the simulators’ universe is allowed 
to have magically unphysical properties. In that scenario, simulism would be more akin to a 
religious belief than a scientific one. 
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Figure 1. Structure and assumptions of the simulation argument. 
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